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SUMMARY OF POSITION AND STATEMENT IN REPLY 
The Brief of Appellees' Jones and Barker/Kerr makes it absolutely clear that the trial 
court committed multiple and reversible error requiring a reversal of the trial court judgment 
and the ordering of a new trial on the issue of compensation payable for the condemnation 
taking. 
As to the first issue, Jones and Barker/Kerr, through a shell game in which the 
claimed paramount interest in the condemned property was conveniently shifted back and 
forth to obtain maximum monied advantage between Kerr on the one hand, and Jones and 
Barker on the other, managed to talk the district court into doing something that had only 
occurred once in over 100 years of Utah jurisprudence - - to switch forward the statutory 
valuation date from that mandated by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11, of September 
3, 1997 to a date when the district court happened to sign an order of intervention on 
August 13,1998. Appellees' purpose in switching the valuation date was to make that date 
more consistent with its alleged comparable sales, most of which reflected enhanced 
values from the larger public project for which the Kerr property had been condemned. 
Typically in eminent domain cases, parties are added or substituted as a matter of 
course, without even a suggestion that the statutory valuation date of service of summons 
and complaint on the owner of record and in possession should be changed. The Friberg 
case is the only decision in the annuls of Utah case law in which the Supreme Court 
concluded that to apply the statutory valuation date under those specific facts, would 
violate the constitutional guarantee of Just Compensation of Article I, Sec. 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. But the prescription of Friberg is narrow and patently exceptional - -
1 
continuance of the case for seven years at the request of UDOT during which time the 
property was frozen in a rapidly escalating market while UDOT determined whether it 
would ever build the freeway for which the Friberg property was condemned. The facts of 
this case do not come even within the shadow zones of Friberg. By switching the valuation 
date, the trial court vastly changed the playing field in determining the market value of the 
condemned property. The ruling, if upheld, would open up Pandora's box to manipulation, 
as in this case, of the value date by the condemnee landowner, and potentially as well, by 
the condemning body. 
Secondly, Appellees' Brief is not able to escape the fact that three of the five 
allegedly comparable sales which its land expert, Cook, used as a basis for his evaluation 
of the condemned property reflected sale prices that were directly enhanced and increased 
by the larger public development project of Davis County, for which the Kerr property was 
condemned. The rulings of the trial judge allowing such sales in evidence to determine 
market value was in violation of the plain dictates of Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City v. Grutter. The error was highly prejudicial and, standing alone, justifies and entitles 
Davis County to a new trial. 
Thirdly, the trial court, over the timely objection of Davis County, permitted the 
evidence and argument of Appellees to the jury that the condemnation verdict would be 
paid by a collateral source - -the private "for-profit" developer of the Farmington Preserve 
Project, PBA. Even the Appellees are at a loss to find judicial support for their evidence 
and, in fact, they all but expressly admit error. Their defense that Davis County did not 
timely object and in any event, the error was harmless, falls on stony ground. The trial 
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judge expressly denied Davis County's pre-trial motion in limine to exclude evidence that 
"Mr. Prows [PBA] is the ultimate source of funding to pay for the judgment." The County's 
objection clearly preserved the error under Utah precedent. The prejudice of the evidence 
and argument of Appellees' counsel is not only clear, it is presumed under Utah law. The 
jury verdict of $1,606,500 was the very highest dollar amount under Appellees' flawed 
evidence of market value. 
On top of all this, the trial judge misapplied and miscalculated the prejudgment 
interest on the verdict awarding over $160,000 of excessive interest. 
The aggregation of prejudicial error or the individual error on any one of the three 
central questions in the appeal require a reversal of the lower court judgment and order 
sending the case back for a new trial on the issue of compensation to be paid for the 
condemnation taking. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE APPELLEES' BRIEF IS A VIRTUAL CONCESSION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SWITCHING THE DATE OF 
VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN FROM THE STATUTORY DATE TO THE 
COINCIDENTAL DATE ON WHICH THE COURT HAPPENED TO SIGN AN 
ORDER PERMITTING JONES AND BARKER TO INTERVENE-
1. Jones and Barker Led The District Court Into Error By Manipulating The 
Valuation Date From September 3,1997 to August 13, 1998, The Date 
Judge Kay Signed The Order Of Intervention. 
What this Court now knows from the Brief of Appellee's is that Jones and Barker, 
as of the date of service of summons under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11, had an 
unconsummated, executory contract for which they had paid $1,000 for the purchase of 
the Kerr Property subject to several contingent events which never transpired. Two of 
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those conditions required that approvals be obtained from Davis County with respect to the 
development of the property and further approvals for use and development of the site 
were required from the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Both of those contingencies were impossible to fulfill and Jones and Barker knew 
that as of the date of service of summons, September 3, 1997. (R. at 14-16, 1158.) 
Moreover, Jones and Barker further knew immediately after they signed the 
unconsummated agreement in May 1997 that the Kerr Property was going to be taken for 
the public project. (R. 1138, 1200, p. 81.) Jones and Barker never, at any time, either 
consummate their executory contract or took possession of any part of the condemned 
property. (R. at 1200 pp. 75, 78; 1201 p. 485; 1209 Ex. 73.) 
Davis County did precisely what it was required to do, that is to say, it served its 
condemnation complaint on September 3,1997 on Kerr's trustee, Zions Bank, the record 
owner and the owner in possession of the condemned property. It had no obligation to 
name as defendants individuals who had essentially an unexercised option to purchase 
the property. 
Jones and Barker cannot escape in this appeal the unrelenting legislative mandate 
of §78-34-11: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and 
its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not 
actually taken, but injuriously affected . . . . (Emphasis added). 
Neither can the Appellees escape the governing law in Utah set forth in State Road 
Comm'n v. Valentine. 349 P.2d 321 (Utah 1960). In that case, the lessee of property under 
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condemnation intervened and joined the action claiming damages for its unexpired term 
of the lease, which lease was entered into a month before the condemnation action. The 
Utah Supreme Court regarded the intervening lessee's interest as "non-compensable" 
because at the time of the hearing on the State's motion for immediate occupancy, the 
lessee had only an "executory contract": 
"At the time of hearing on motion for immediate occupancy, the instrument 
entitled a 'lease' was nothing more than an executory contract for a lease, 
as yet unenforceable as a lease, and hence, non-compensable." (Emphasis 
added). 
]d. 322-23. In their Brief, Jones, Barker and Kerr attempt to distinguish Valentine on the 
basis that the State was not aware of the Valentine leasehold interest at the time the 
condemnation action was filed and summons served on the landowner. That argument 
simply will not wash, for the level of knowledge of the State in Valentine, in either being 
aware or unaware of the executory lease, was completely irrelevant to the Valentine Court, 
and indeed, was not at issue. 
The record is clear that at no time prior to October 21,1997, did Jones and Barker 
or Kerr, for that matter, inform Davis County or the court of the existence of their 
unrecorded, unconsummated, executory contract on the Kerr Property. (R. at 268, 277.) 
That was two and one-half months after the date of service of summons on Kerr, the 
property owner. It was not until April 17,1998 that Jones and Barker even filed a motion 
to intervene, which motion was uncontested and happened to be signed by the district 
judge on August 13,1998. (R. at 83-94,113,116-18.) That simple order of intervention 
had nothing to do with the court obtaining jurisdiction over the property. The latter had 
taken place by the service of summons on September 3, 1997. 
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The argument made by Jones and Barker for switching the valuation date to the 
date of the intervention order has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court under 
similar facts in the early decision of BrighamCitvv. Rich. 97 Pac. 220 (Utah 1908). There, 
Brigham City commenced condemnation proceedings against Rich, the acknowledged 
legal owner of the subject property and, upon motion, secured an order for immediate 
occupancy. Thereafter, Rich closed on a previous unrecorded sale of the subject property 
to a third party, who thereafter joined the action contending that the date of valuation 
should be switched from the date of service of summons upon Rich to "some date 
subsequent to the time it acquired its title." Id. 221-22. The trial court in Rich rejected the 
argument to move the valuation date and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision: 
"When this [immediate occupancy] order was made and Brigham City 
pursuant thereto went into possession . . ., the subject property was 
appropriated to a public use and nothing remained thereafter for the court to 
do save to fix the amount of compensation and to require its payment. . . 
Appellant not only claimed under Rich's rights, but it succeeded to them after 
the order of condemnation and occupancy had been made with full 
knowledge thereof. . . After the order of condemnation had been made by 
the court, no one could acquire any rights to the [subject property]. The most 
that appellant can be entitled to, as between it and Rich, would be the right 
to receive the condemnation money for the land." ([brackets added] 
emphasis added). 
Id. at 225. The fact is that Jones and Barker, like the appellant in Brigham City v. Rich, 
had not acquired a contract interest in the Kerr Property as of the date of service of 
summons, September 3, 1997 or as of the date of the order of immediate occupancy on 
the Kerr Property, October 31,1997. Indeed, Jones and Barker admitted at trial in March 
of 2000 that even as of that date, they had not vet closed on the sales contract. (R. At 
1200 pp. 75, 78; 1201 p. 219; 1202 p. 485; 1209 Ex. 73.) 
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Jones and Barker contend that Davis County "manipulated" the condemnation 
proceeding by filing its complaint after learning of Jones and Barker's interest "to scare 
them off." (App. Br. at 10.) The only manipulation and gamesmanship in this case was 
that of Jones and Barker, along with Kerr. At the outset, the beneficial interest in the Kerr 
property was acknowledged by Appellees to be in the name of Kerr trustee and that the 
trustee had the only justiciable interest in the property for the purpose of determining the 
entitlement to condemn, just compensation and the order of immediate occupancy on 
October 21,1997. (R. at 2, 26; 1194 p. 69.) When Jones and Barker sought to intervene 
six months later, in April 1998, the "beneficial interest" in the property was shifted to the 
moving intervenors so they could argue that Davis County's "failure" to name Jones and 
Barker as necessary parties in interest required the establishment of a valuation date later 
than the date of service of summons on Kerr, viz., September 3,1997. (R. at 249,254-55.) 
After persuading Judge Kay that the valuation date should be switched and moved forward 
to August 13,1998, the beneficial interest in the property then shifted back, again, to Kerr 
for the trial of the case. It was Jones and Barker's position at trial that Max Kerr was the 
beneficial owner of the property and that Jones and Barker unconsummated, executory 
contract for $531,000 was completely inadmissable before the jury in determining the 
amount of compensation and damages. Not only did Jones and Barker's counsel object 
to the mere mention of the Jones and Barker unconsummated transaction, but they argued 
and introduced evidence that "on the date fixed for valuation..., Mr. Kerr was holding [the 
property]," "[Davis County] took away Mr. Kerr's ability to sell the property," and Mr. Kerr 
"couldn't close [on the contract to Jones and Barker] because of the condemnation." (R. 
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1200 pp. 75, 78; R. 1201 p. 219; R. 1202 p. 485; R. 1209 Ex. 73.) Such shell game is 
"manipulation" on a grand scale. 
The intrigue and scheme of Jones and Barker to obtain a later valuation date than 
the statutory date fixed by the Legislature under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 demonstrate 
the difficulties facing the court in an objective enforcement of the eminent domain statutes 
if Jones and Barker along with Kerr are permitted to succeed in their clever maneuver. 
Such cleverness should not prevail in this appeal. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court Precedent In Fribera Has Nothing To Do With 
The Facts of This Case. 
Jones and Barker/Kerr's brief argues that the switching of the trial date in this case 
was supported by the precedent of Utah State Road Comm. v. Fribera. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 
1984). Of the thousands of Utah eminent domain cases, Friberg is the only case in over 
110 years of Utah jurisprudence where the valuation date has been moved, and then for 
a very precise and narrow reason. 
In Friberg, there had been a seven-year continuance and hiatus, between 1972 and 
1979, sought by the State Road Commission (now UDOT) so that UDOT could determine 
whether the 1-215 freeway was, in fact, going to be built. During that period time, there had 
been a major increase in the value of the Friberg property caused by the general increase 
and inflationary factors in the market generally completely unassociated with increased 
market value caused by the construction of the 1-215 project for which the Friberg land was 
condemned. The time lapse of seven years during which Friberg's property was frozen in 
the market was so extraordinary that the Supreme Court found under those unique facts 
that the statutory valuation date would deprive Fribergs of the Just Compensation 
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guarantees of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, as well as Due Process of Law. 
The showing made by Jones and Barker in an attempt to demonstrate that Davis 
County had delayed the condemnation proceedings between the statutory date of 
September 3, 1997 and seven months later, on March 8, 1998, when Jones and Barker 
moved to the date of their intervention is no demonstration at all and does not come up to 
the shoe tops of the facts and the basis of the Supreme Court holding in Fribera. Here, 
there was no showing of any of the proceedings or of a continuance being granted, or even 
sought, by Davis County. On top of that, there was no demonstration, whatsoever, that 
there had been a major increase in seven months in the market value of the Kerr Property 
caused by the general inflation in the economy and general market conditions. Rather, 
Jones and Barker had to rely upon allegedly comparable sales whose prices were largely 
dictated by enhanced values attributable to the very project for which the Kerr Property was 
condemned. Those facts are missing absolutely in Fribera. 
But the error of switching from the statutory valuation date in this case is 
exacerbated by the fact that Fribera was confined to its narrow facts. The Fribera Court, 
itself, expressly recognized the fact that the ruling was the only decision in the entire body 
of Utah jurisprudence in which there has been a departure from the statutory date of 
service of summons. In doing so, the Court cited cases from 1905 to the date of the 
opinion. 687 P.2d at 828. 
But, the key to Fribera was the judicial recognition of the stark reality of seven years 
passage of time in which a landowner's property was placed in limbo, under a continuance 
order requested by UDOT, while UDOT decided whether it was going to ultimately need 
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the Friberg property and proceed to construct the freeway. No such facts exist in the 
instant case, "in any degree comparable" to Friberg. ]d. at 828. 
Appellees' argument that the statutory valuation date under § 78-34-11 "would be 
unfair" has been consistently rejected in a number of cases by the Utah high Court. See, 
Appl. Br. at 17-18. The attempt to claim that Qgden L. & I. Rv. Co. v. Jones, 168 Pac. 548 
(Utah 1917), and Oregon S. L & U.N. Rv. Co. v. Mitchell. 17 Pac. 693 (Utah 1899), are 
somehow helpful to Appellees' flawed position only serves to underscore the fallacy of their 
position. Both decisions are inapposite because their were no summons served on the 
property owner in either case. In the instant case, summons was served on the only 
property owner, who was also in possession of the condemned property. 
3. Judicial and Public Policy Strongly Favors a Uniform and Objective 
Date of Valuation to Preclude Misuse and Manipulation By Either Party 
in an Eminent Domain Case. 
Principles of uniformity and objectivity are important factors in the valuation process 
in eminent domain. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Walter M. Qgden and Sons, Inc., 805 P.2d 
173, 175 (Utah 1990); State Road Comm. v. Prestwich. 452 P.2d 548 (Utah 1969). It is 
important to both condemnor and condemnee by not only providing an objective and 
reasonable date upon which both the trial judge and the parties can rely, but it also has the 
advantage of precluding the condemnor and condemnee from manipulating or exploiting 
the date of value to their own purposes. For example, if the property were condemned in 
a falling or depreciating market and additional parties were to be added subsequent to the 
original service of summons, the condemning agency would not be entitled, under existing 
law, to ask the trial court to switch the date of valuation so as to reduce the market value 
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of the condemned property in the falling market. By the same token, it would preclude the 
condemnee in a rising market from claiming that the valuation date should be switched so 
as to obtain a higher market value than was extant at the date of service of summons. 
A valuation date that is permitted to vacillate from case to case, as advocated by 
Appellees, opens the door for determining the date of fair market value by tactical 
gamesmanship and cleverness. The rule of law rejects such a result. Buxton & 
Christopher Architects v. State of Utah. 29 P.3d 650, 656 (Utah 2001). 
4. The Legal Error of the Trial Judge Was Highly Prejudicial to Davis 
County. 
The error committed by the district court in switching the value date from September 
3, 1997 to August 13, 1998 was highly prejudicial. It suddenly made sales of other 
property made after the valuation date far more comparable and relevant than they would 
have been otherwise. It made a difference of between $100,000-$200,000 under and 
depending upon the analysis of each of the expert witnesses. Couple that fact with the trial 
court's further erroneous ruling, admitting into evidence enhanced sales within the project 
for which the Jones and Barker/Kerr property was condemned, results in an increased 
value estimate of Cook's appraisal of $1,606,000. 
The ruling of the trial judge switching the statutory date of value forward to the day 
which he happened to sign an order permitting intervention of Jones and Barker 
constituted prejudicial error, entitling Davis County to a new trial on the issues of just 
compensation using the statutory date of valuation, September 3, 1997. 
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II. APPELLEES' BRIEF LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE ALLEGED 
COMPARABLE SALES OF PROPERTIES WHICH WERE ENHANCED IN VALUE 
BY THE LARGER PUBLIC PROJECT FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
WAS CONDEMNED. 
1. The Rule of the Utah Supreme Court in Grutter was Violated. 
The subject property, at the date of valuation under § 78-34-11, was largely 
comprised of swamp land with a high water table that placed the ground under water a 
good portion of the year. It had no commercial access rights, and it had no utility facilities 
available to it. (See Attachment 1). The property was condemned for flood control and 
wetland mitigation resulting from the larger development public project of Davis County to 
the north. (R. at 1-13.) Jones and Barker/Kerr acknowledged that the property lacked 
access to it for commercial development, but claimed that a proposed commercial road 
built through PBA property to the east could be considered in determining the highest and 
best use of the Kerr Property before the taking. (R. at 1201 pp. 240-41,277.) Thus, it was 
contended that the property was prime commercial real estate. A substantial number of 
the allegedly comparable sales utilized by the Appellees' witness, Cook, reflected sales 
prices which were directly enhanced by the public project of Davis County as to which PBA 
had been given the contractual responsibility to develop. The effect of that development 
necessitated the condemnation acquisition of the Kerr Property. Such was not a point of 
dispute in the case; indeed, Kerr, Jones and Barker stipulated that the property could be 
condemned for flood control, which enabled the larger public development project to be 
realized. (R. at 237-39.) 
In their Brief, Appellees have attempted to end-run the clear import of 
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Redevelopment Aaencv of Salt Lake City v. Grutter. 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986) which 
precludes enhancements in market value from the public project for which the subject 
property is a part thereof or affected thereby. Davis County's position has been consistent 
that while the property was condemned for flood control, it was inextricably linked to the 
larger public project which included the development of PBA properties immediately to the 
north. (R. 1201 pp. 353-57.) As a consequence, sales of those PBA parcels were not 
admissible in evidence because their consideration violates the anti-enhancement rule of 
Grutter. 
While the Appellees admit that enhancements to the PBA tracts resulting from the 
condemnation acquisition are not admissible in the valuation of the Kerr Property, (Appl. 
Br. at 31-32), they nonetheless argue that the Kerr Property should be valued as 
commercial land, having commercial access with a commercial highest and best use 
because the property bordered upon abutting ground of PBA. The problem undermining 
the argument is that the ground was greatly enhanced in value by the Davis County public 
project. It is the clear holding of Grutter and of supporting precedent throughout the 
Country that in cases where a public project enhances the value of adjacent properties to 
the property actually condemned, the enhanced value of the adjacent properties may not 
be taken into consideration and is not admissible in determinina the fair market value of 
the condemned premises. United States v. Miller. 317 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1943); Board of 
County Comm. of Eagle County v. Vale Assocs. Ltd.. 468 P.2d 842, 847 (Colo. 1970); 
Latham Holding Co. v. State. 209 N.E.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. 1965). 
If the law were other than that spelled out in Grutter and Miller, the landowner would 
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reap a "windfall" by reason of enhanced values of neighboring properties caused by the 
government project that necessitated the taking of its ground. The Appellees' argument, 
if adopted, would allow a condemnor to offer into evidence the reduced sales prices of 
neighboring properties which are affected by the public project for which the condemned 
property is taken. For example, if a government agency condemned property for a waste 
incinerator plant, the Appellees' argument herein would allow the government agency to 
offer into evidence, on the issue of fair market value, sales of nearby parcels which were 
devalued and depressed due to the anticipated waste plant. The rule against 
enhancement protects both the condemnor and condemnee and is the law of the case. 
Jones and Barker/Kerr cannot avoid it. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the Record to support the Appellees' argument 
that the PBA development could have taken place without the condemnation of the Kerr 
property. Appellees' expert on land value, Cook, plainly testified that the condemnation 
of the Kerr, Jones and Barker property was an integral component that permitted the 
development of the PBA properties to the immediate north and that the property was 
"directly related to the [public] project." (R. at 1201, pp. 299-300, 313-14; R. at 1202, p. 
456.) 
2. Contrary to Appellees' Brief. There Expert. Cook. Could Not. In Law. 
Make a "Personal Adjustment" to Eliminate the Enhancement From the 
PBA Sales. 
Appellees make a fundamental mistake in contending in their Brief that Cook made 
a "downward adjustment" in the sale price of the PBA sales to account for enhancement. 
The argument fails to recognize that the admissibility of the alleged comparable sale does 
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not depend on whether the particular appraiser "adjusted" the sale to account for the 
enhancement. That sort of rule would simply let the appraiser "manipulate" by a 
"subjective adjustment" whatever he decided. The rule of Grutter and Miller does not allow 
the appraiser to exercise his self-help in justifying the use of an enhanced value sale. 
Rather, the anti-enhancement rule precludes the admissibility of the sale, at all, just as a 
sale to a government agency under the threat of condemnation or bankruptcy sale are 
inadmissible. State Road Comm. v. Peterson. 366 P.2d 76 (Utah 1961); Redevelopment 
Agency of SLC v. Mitsui Investment. 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974). Thus, the three PBA 
sales should not have been received in evidence before the jury, as a matter of law, 
regardless of the appraiser's subjective judgment. 
In point of fact, however, Cook did not make a subjective, downward adjustment in 
the Kerr Property because of the enhanced value of the PBA sales as a result of the 
project for which the Kerr Property was condemned. He stated emphatically that even 
though the PBA sales were enhanced in value as a result of the condemnation of the Kerr 
Property, "[t]hose are influences we can't take into account." (R. 1201 p. 254.) Cook 
made other subjective "adjustments" to the PBA sales, but not for enhancement in the 
market value of the comparable sales caused by the project. "That's totally inappropriate" 
testified Cook. (R. 1201 at 254.) 
3. The Error of the Trial Court Was Prejudicial. 
Three of Cook's five allegedly comparable sales involved PBA parcels inside the 
larger public project that sold at an average price per acre of $170,807. The two non-PBA 
parcels utilized by Cook sold at an average price per acre of $102,450. Thus, the average 
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price per acre reflected an increase of over 66%. It is thus clear that the error in admitting 
such sales was highly prejudicial. 
To sustain their position, Appellees are forced to rely upon a statement from State 
Road Comm. v. Woollev. 390 P.2d 860 (Utah 1964), in which the Supreme Court held that 
in determining market value, "the jury may consider 'all factors bearing upon such value 
that any prudent purchaser would take into account . . ., including any potential 
development in the area reasonably to be expected.'" The trouble with that argument is 
that the quoted language was specifically repudiated in Grutter. where it was characterized 
as the "enhancement language" from Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward. 347 
P.2d 862 (Utah 1959). Ward was expressly overturned in the Grutter decision. 734 P.2d 
at 436-37. 
The trial judge committed prejudicial error in permitting the PBA sales into evidence. 
Objections were made and reserved by Davis County. The error plainly requires a new 
trial. 
III. THE ARGUMENT OF APPELLEES THAT PAYMENT BY PBA OF THE 
CONDEMNATION AWARD WAS RELEVANT IN DETERMINING MARKET 
VALUE IS MADE IN THE FACE OF PLAIN UTAH PRECEDENT TO THE 
CONTRARY AND REQUIRES THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT BE 
REVERSED AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED. 
1. Irrelevant Evidence That PBA is the Source of Payment of the Jury 
Award of Just Compensation was Erroneously Admitted by the Lower 
Court. 
Appellees simultaneously march in opposite directions on the question of whether 
evidence was admitted before the jury on the collateral source of payment by PBA of the 
condemnation award. On the one hand, they argue at page 41 of their Brief: 
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"Davis County has not cited any trial testimony to the effect that Prows was 
going to pay the condemnation award. . . . All it has cited is statements of 
counsel, which are not evidence and were not objected to." 
Appl. Br. at 41. However, in its Statement of the Case at p. 11, Appellees state to this 
Court that evidence of PBA's agreement to pay the condemnation award was admitted 
before the jury: 
"Later, evidence that the developer had agreed to pay for the condemnation 
was admitted without objection. (R. 1200 p. 39.)" 
The fact is clear that Jones and Barker/Kerr presented evidence as well as argument of 
counsel that PBA would pay the jury verdict. (R. 1004,1200 pp. 17, 39; R. 1201 p. 379; R. 
1202 pp. 459-60, 482, 517.) There is no question but that the attention of the jury was 
diverted from the objective standard of market value to the collateral and totally irrelevant 
issue as to who was going to pay and satisfy the jury verdict. Utah case precedent has 
consistently rejected such evidence and argument of counsel as inflammatory and 
prejudicial. 
In Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 186 (Utah 1962), it was argued that where the 
defendant has no insurance the jury should be informed because insurance coverage 
would be assumed by jurors and its absence should be disclosed to counteract any 
inclination to be generous with non-existent insurance money. The Supreme Court clearly 
rejected that argument and ordered a new trial because of the immateriality and prejudice 
of such evidence and argument: 
"It seems hardly necessary to state that the matter of insurance is quite 
immaterial to issues as to liability and damages, or the amount thereof. It is 
also true that inasmuch as the defendant is entitled to have this extraneous 
matter excluded from the case, the plaintiff is entitled to the same protection 
if he so desires. If the defendant were allowed to show noninsurance and 
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the plaintiff allowed to rebut it, the mischief which could develop from 
preoccupation with the immaterial issue is obvious." 
Id. at 187 (emphasis added). The authorities cited in Davis County's Opening Brief are 
unassailed by Appellees. (Applts. Br., Point III, p. 41-43.) In a statement that flies in the 
face of Hi]i, Jones and Barker/Kerr make the rejected argument that "Utah law favors 
informed juries" on source of payment because "jurors naturally assume that condemnation 
awards come from taxpayer dollars." (Appl. Br. at 45.) 
The receipt of evidence and argument of counsel that PBA, a private corporation, 
was benefitting from the condemnation acquisition and was going to pay the condemnation 
award was reversible error. 
2. Davis County Preserved Its Objection When The Trial Court Denied Its 
Motion in Limine To Exclude Evidence of the Source of Payment. 
It is clear in this case that Davis County, in advance of trial, filed a motion in limine 
to exclude evidence at trial relative to the collateral source of payment by PBA of the jury 
verdict on compensation and damages for the condemnation taking. At the hearing on the 
motion in limine, Judge Kay stated that he was not going to exclude evidence that PBA had 
nothing to do with the condemnation acquisition. (R. at 1199 pp. 60-61.) Judge Kay then 
stated expressly on the record: 
"[Davis County's motion to exclude evidence] of developer being involved js 
going to be denied and it can be brought up during the trial 
(R. 1199 p. 61.) (emphasis added.). Thus, there is no doubt that Davis County's motion 
in limine was denied outright. The statement that the issue "can be brought up during the 
trial" in no way modified the denial, but rather was a statement to counsel for Jones and 
Barker/Kerr that it could be brought up during the trial. 
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But the matter does not stop there. Most importantly, Judge Kay thereafter signed 
an order prepared by Appellees which absolutely denied outright the motion in limine: 
"Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence that Mr. Prows is the ultimate source 
of funding to pay for the judgment in this matter is denied." 
(R. 599.) (emphasis added.). That unambiguous language of the trial court's order is 
dispositive of the issue. As the Supreme Court stated in Evans v. State of Utah, 963 P.2d 
177, 180 (Utah 1998): 
"Regardless of the language used during the hearing, the language in the 
court's final written order controls." 
id. 180. The order of Judge Kay is unequivocal and unambiguous that Davis County's 
motion in limine to keep the collateral source of payment out of evidence was denied. Park 
City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co.. 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978) (Appellees argument that 
"denial" of a motion in limine is ambiguous has been squarely rejected by this Court and 
the Supreme Court); Salt Lake City v. Holtman. 806 P.2d 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State 
of Utah v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 116, 119 n.4 (Utah 1989). 
When a motion in limine has been denied, it is unnecessary to make a further 
objection at trial in order to preserve the objection on appeal. State of Utah v. Griffin. 754 
P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Salt Lake Citv v. Holtman. supra. 
Judge Kay made a fundamental error in denying Davis County's motion in limine. 
After Judge Kay signed the order, expressly denying the motion, Jones and Barker/Kerr 
argued the issue to and presented evidence before the jury on this completely irrelevant 
question, with the clear intent of creating bias and prejudice against the Plaintiff, Davis 
County, and sympathy for Jones and Barker/Kerr. They cannot be permitted to get away 
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with such significant error by claiming that having lost the motion in limine on the issue, 
Davis County should have continued to object at trial and failing to do so, invited the error. 
3. Davis County Did Not Invite Error. 
Appellees contend that Davis County "opened the door" to the evidence and 
argument that Prows [PBA] was the source of payment of the condemnation award. (Appl. 
Br. 43.) Such claim is premised upon a simple comment by the Deputy Davis County 
Attorney in opening statement in which it was said that Davis County was a prudent 
manager of the County's tax money. (R. 1200 p. 17.) That and that, alone, was all that 
was said by Davis County on the subject because counsel for Appellees made the 
irrelevant objection before the jury that "I've got to object on argument on a prudent 
manager. They are not paying for this property, the developer is . . . . " (R. 1200 p. 17.) 
The obvious fact is that Davis County made no reference directly, or indirectly, to 
the condemnation acquisition costs or the source of payment; rather, at the most, County 
counsel started to speak about the larger Farmington Preserve Project when Appellees' 
counsel cut him off. That is not a statement upon which Appellees can palm-off the 
prejudicial error of both evidence and argument as to the source of payment of the jury 
verdict. Okon v. State of Texas. 391 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965) (finding the 
state's argument that "[t]he State has a duty to you to see that public monies are expended 
in a proper fashion," not to be an improper appeal to the jurors' self-interest as taxpayers). 
The cases cited by Appellees in their Brief are factually inapposite. 
4. The Error of the Trial Court in Permitting Evidence of the Collateral 
Source of Payment Bv PBA Was Highly Prejudicial. 
The Appellees' Brief plainly recognizes the error that was committed, for they wind 
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up the argument in their Brief by the heading that "Any Error Was Not Prejudicial." Their 
acknowledgment of error, while candid, could hardly be anything else in light of the 
evidence submitted by Jones and Barker/Kerr to the jury and the closing argument of their 
counsel in which he pointedly stated: 
"And I want to ask you, what gives the government the r i g h t . . . to take 
something from Max Kerr and give it to someone else? What gives the 
government the right in a for-profit company to take Max Kerr's zoning and 
everything he had and give it to Mr. Prows, to give it to a for-profit 
corporation?" 
(R. 1202, p. 481.) The obvious target of counsel's argument was the developer, PBA. The 
question that must be asked in this appeal is how could that sort of prejudicial 
argument have anything to do with the issue of fair market value, an objective standard 
involving the willing and able buyer and seller in the market? The argument of Appellees' 
counsel might have been made at a far earlier point in the case if Kerr had contested the 
entitlement to condemn. But Jones and Barker/Kerr stipulated to the right of Davis County 
to condemn the Kerr Property, leaving the only question before the court to be tried by jury 
the traditional issue of fair market value. (R. at 237-239.) There can be no doubt that 
counsel's argument was specifically intended to prejudice and bias the jury against PBA 
and to incur sympathy for Max Kerr. 
The prejudice from this evidence and argument is implicit and overwhelming. As 
stated by the Alabama Court of Appeals in Nicrosi v. City of Montgomery. 406 So.2d 951 
(Ala.Ct.App. 1981): 
"That the expenses incident to condemnation and the award itself are to be 
paid by private parties is immaterial when the property thus being acquired 
. . . is to be used for a public benefit, and . . . it [is] highly prejudicial for 
members of the jury to be informed that someone other than the condemning 
21 
party would have to pay the verdict." 
Id. at 952-53 (emphasis added). The jury verdict reflects the prejudice and bias of the 
inflammatory and prejudicial evidence, coming in squarely on the Cook appraisal of 
$1,606,500. That amount was $1,075,500 higher than Jones and Barker had agreed to 
pay under their unconsummated, executory contract entered into on May 1997, barely 
three months before the date of service of summons in this case. (R. at 87, 908.) 
The error of the trial court is manifest and the prejudice is obvious. A new trial on 
the issue of damages and compensation is required. 
IV. CONTRARY TO APPELLEES' FATUOUS ARGUMENT. THE TRIAL COURT 
ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED ERROR IN CALCULATING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
The argument of Appellees with regard to the date from which prejudgment interest 
is to be determined is punctuated with factual inconsistency and contradiction and by the 
absence of legal analysis. 
To begin with, there is no question that the prejudgment interest, to which a 
landowner is entitled in eminent domain, stems from the controlling statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-9. (8% per annum from either the date of the order of occupancy or the date 
of actual possession by the government, whichever is earlier). Davis County did not take 
possession of the property until after April 1999. The Order of Occupancy of October 31, 
1997 was entered by the trial judge prior to both Jones and Barker filing its motion to 
intervene in April 1998, as well as the trial court changing the date of valuation to August 
13, 1998. But, Appellees told the trial judge that such October 31, 1997 order was "void" 
because the court lacked jurisdiction: 
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"BY MR. OLSON: Yes, but as to my clients, the order of immediate 
occupancy [referencing the October 31, 1997 order] - - that was void 
because it lacked jurisdiction. And I believe as to my clients, the statute's 
very clear that that interest runs from the date of immediate occupancy or the 
date of possession, and possession is later than immediate occupancy. We 
don't have an argument that it is earlier." 
(R. 1198, p. 35.) Counsel making the statement was representing all Appellees at the time. 
After Jones and Barker intervened, the court signed another order of immediate 
occupancy on April 13,1999, this order as to all parties. As of that date, Davis County had 
not taken possession of the property and all of the defendant/landowners Jones, Barker 
and Kerr were not only represented by the same counsel, their interests in the 
compensation award were indivisible and non-severable. 
The law is clear that an order of immediate occupancy is like the eminent domain 
complaint, in rem, and makes no distinction as to particular interests. Rich. 97 Pac. at 225. 
If as Jones and Barker/Kerr argue, the October 31,1997 occupancy order was "void," the 
date of that void order cannot be the basis for the determination of interest on a judgment 
based on the changed valuation date of August 13, 1998. State Road Comm. v. 
Danielson. 247 P.2d 900 (Utah 1952). That is why Davis County takes the position that 
the October 31, 1997 order was effectively struck or superceded by the March 8, 1999 
order of occupancy. 
The Appellees want it all ways. On the one hand, they want the switched and later 
valuation date for purposes of assessing damages to all the defendant/landowners. On 
the other hand, they want to use the date of a "void" order of occupancy upon which to 
calculate the prejudgment interest as to all the Defendants on the damage verdict based 
upon the switched value date. 
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The Appellees, Jones and Barker/Kerr, are trapped by self-contradiction and 
inconsistent argument. The trial court bought in to the paradox of argument and calculated 
prejudgment interest of $298,346.00 from October 31, 1997 to the date of the Judgment, 
May 4,2000. (R. at 949-50.) The court prejudicially erred in that determination and should 
have, in all events, determined interest from the date of the enforceable order of immediate 
occupancy, March 8, 1999. The dollar difference in the erroneous calculation and the 
proper calculation of interest is $160,185.00. 
As part of the reversal of the Judgment in this case, this Court should also 
determine that interest should be calculated from the enforceable date of occupancy. 
However, even if the Judgment of the trial court were affirmed on the other issues raised 
in this appeal, interest on the Judgment must be calculated from March 8, 1999. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The prejudicial error in this case is manifold and pervasive. The judgment on the 
verdict of the jury must be reversed and set aside and a new trial ordered on the issue of 
compensation for the condemnation taking, using the statutory valuation date, excluding 
sales whose prices were enhanced by the public project, and without reference to the 
collateral source of payment of the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. C A t o S f i E ^ ^ ^ 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
Special Deputy Davis County Attorney 
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